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PATENT RIGHTS ON PHARMACEUTICAL
PRODUCTS AND AFFORDABLE DRUGS:
CAN TRIPS PROVIDE A SOLUTION?
AMIT GUPTAt

I.
INTRODUCTION

In the last few years, the debate over affordable life saving drugs
for the poor and the nature of patent regime for the pharmaceutical
industry has attracted more attention than any other issue within the
World Trade Organization (WTO). The focus of the controversy is the
requirement of an extensive, globally uniform patent protection regime for pharmaceutical products as described in 'The Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights' (TRIPS).' The
2
Agreement marked the beginning of the global property epoch.
Before TRIPS came into force, many developing countries did not allow patents for pharmaceutical products, 3 only pharmaceutical
processes could be patented. 4 Others simply excluded medicines from
the ambit of patent laws.5 This allowed local production of generic
versions of the patented medicines, 6 and kept the prices of formulation at a much lower level then that in the developed world. 7 Article
t B.Sc., B.C.L (Oxford), LL.M. (Columbia)
1 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
2 Peter Drahos, Intellectual Propertyand Human Rights, Intell. Prop. Q. No.3 349, 356
(1999) [hereinafter Drahos].
3 A product patent is different from a patent over a process. Patenting a process implies that only the process through which a product is made can be patented. The final
product is not included under the right. A patent holder can restrict the other party from
using the process, but he can make no claims on the product. Thus, another manufacturer
can market the same product as long as she uses a different process.
4 E.g., Argentina, India; See Theresa Beeby Lewis, Patent Protectionfor the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Survey of the Patent Laws of Various Countries, 30 INT'L LAW 835
(1996) [hereinafter Lewis).
5 E.g., Brazil, Thailand, Korea.
6 The success of many Indian pharmaceutical companies, for example Cipla, is attributed to a weak patent regime.
7 For example, AZT (a drug for treatment of HIV) treatment was produced at a supply cost of $ 48 a month in India as compared with $239 in the United States; Lariam, a
treatment for malaria, at a cost of $4 as compared with $37 in the U.S., according to a UN
document published in 2000. See Audrey R. Chapman, Approaching Intellectual Property
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27 of TRIPS provides, however, that there should be patent protec-

tion for inventions in all fields of technology without discrimination.
According to this absolute command, there ought to be no distinction
between (i) a process patent and a product patent, and (ii) between

the industries. In contrast to this specific provision, there are general
provisions such as Articles 7 and 8 (dealing with 'objectives' and 'principles' of the Agreement respectively). The language of these provi-

sions is vague and does not provide guidelines for their
implementation. Moreover, Article 6 (concerning 'exhaustion' of intellectual property rights), Article 30 (relating to 'exceptions to the
[patent] rights conferred') and Article 31 (dealing with 'other use

without authorization of the right holder') allow much scope for varying interpretations.
The ambiguity on fundamental issues has led to controversies in
the past on the application of TRIPS. The developing countries affected most by the HIV/AIDS crisis began exploring options like compulsory licensing and parallel imports, partly to promote the generic
industry and partly to keep drug prices down. This was met with opposition from big pharmaceutical companies and governments support-

ing a strong patent regime. The most notable dispute arose in South
Africa where the pharmaceutical industry, along with the U.S. and the
European Union opposed the government's efforts to provide cheap
drugs.8 A similar controversy erupted when the U.S. filed a complaint
with the WTO over Brazil's patent legislation allowing local manufacas a Human Right: Obligations Related to Article 15(1)(c), discussion paper submitted to
the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 24th Sess., at 22, U.N. Doc. E/
C.12/2000/12 (2000).
8 See Frank Wooldridge, Analysis: Affordable Medicines - TRIPS and US Policies, Intellectual Property Quarterly No. 1 (2000) 103; see also Toby Kasper , South Africa's Victory for the Developing World, Mddecins Sans Frontires available at http://www.access
med-msf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid=3182001040389&contenttype=PARA& (last visited March 22, 2002) [hereinafter Kasper]; ('Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of
South Africa' filed a case against the South African Government over the Medicine and
Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997. The legislation, among other
things, authorized Minister of Health to 'prescribe conditions' for the supply of more affordable medicines so as to protect the health of public. In particular, under Section 15 C
of the Act the Minister could grant compulsory licenses and allow measures such as parallel importing. The United States and the European Union demanded that South Africa
should comply with US defined TRIPS plus requirements and complained that the section
violated articles 27 and 28 of TRIPS and failed to take into account articles 6 and 31.
Though United States and South African governments reached an agreement before WTO
Seattle Ministerial Conference, the pharmaceutical industry did not withdraw the lawsuit.
Interestingly, the association's principal objection to Section 15 C was not that it violated
TRIPS, but that the provision was so broad that it authorized the Health Minister to abrogate all rights of pharmaceutical patent holders, and thus, it violated the South African
Constitution. However, the South African Court could not announce a verdict. After a
sustained campaign by NGOs and activists the lawsuit was dropped. But, as a result of a
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turing of generic drugs. The United States, however withdrew its complaint against Brazil in June 2001. 9
Granting a right to patent is akin to a grant of a monopoly 0 because it allows the patent holder to manipulate the market price of the
product. Thus, if patent rights for pharmaceutical products result in
higher prices, the issue is whether the existing patent regime, by treating pharmaceuticals at par with other fields of technology, conflicting

with the right to health. In particular, do the provisions of TRIPS
(written, interpreted, and applied), restrict WTO member countries
implementing measures to protect and promote the health of their citizens? If they do, then there is a strong case, legally and morally, that
TRIPS should be amended or repealed. The evidence on the value of

patent rights to society, however, is mixed. It is not certain that we
would be much better off without an intellectual property regime. 1 In
this paper I avoid debating whether some other rights- or rewardbased system would serve society better. I assume for the purposes of

this paper that it is much better to be a part of the system, and there
are advantages of working from within the international trade regime. 12 Thus, the need is to engage in a dialogue while at the same
constant pressure from pharmaceutical industry, the implementation of the said Act was
suspended and the implementing regulations were not in force even after a year).
9 Kasper, supra note 8; see generally http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/brazil (last visited December 26 2003); (under the agreement, the parties decided to negotiate all disputes on the issue through a bilateral "Consultative Mechanism," and Brazil was required
to notify the US government in advance in the event it finds it necessary to issue a compulsory license under its patent law).
10 Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE at 309 (2nd ed. 1999).
11 For an excellent critique of the legal theories for intellectual property rights, see
Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31 (1989); see
also

EDITH

T.

PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM,

20-41

(1951); see also PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 47-48
(1996); (scholars are also dissatisfied with the term of the protection granted by the intellectual property rights); see David Vaver, Creating a FairIntellectual Property System for
the 21st Century, 10 OTAGO L.REV. 1 (2001); see generally JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS,
SOFTWARE, AND SPLEEN: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY

(1996) [hereinafter BOYLE]; but see Harvey E. Bale, Jr., Patent Protectionand Pharmaceutical Innovation, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 95 (1996) (for an opposing view, which
supports the intellectual property rights in its current form); see also Henry Grabowski,

Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals,5 J. INT'L ECON. L., 849 (2002); see
also Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. ScI. 173
(1986); see also Shanker A. Singham, Competition Policy and the Stimulation of Innovation:
TRIPS and the Interface Between Competition and Patent Protection in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 363 (2000).
12 Most of the countries are a part of the WTO. As of April 4, 2003, 146 countries were
members of the organization, information availableat http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/thewtoe.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2003) (thus, by deciding to opt out of the system, an
individual country is not only isolated, it is also deprived of benefits that may accrue from a
multilateral trading system).
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time remaining within the system. In this paper, I highlight the possible solutions within the TRIPS Agreement, and discuss the recent developments within the WTO framework. Part II of the paper
evaluates TRIPS from a human rights perspective to see what extent
the text of the TRIPS Agreement accommodates human rights concerns. Part III highlights the three possible options: compulsory licensing, parallel imports and the Article 30 exception. It concludes that
the latter would provide the most feasible mechanism. Part IV discusses the Doha Declaration, the TRIPS Council's Decision on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, and notes that the WTO is favoring
a solution that might fail to achieve the intended results. Finally, I
conclude that the current controversy strengthens the calls for linking
human rights, intellectual property rights, and trade so that the current system overcomes the technocratic notions that continue to bind
it and make it blind towards the majority of the global population.
II.
TRIPS

AND A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE

There is an implicit reference to human rights issues in TRIPS if
the agreement is examined from a human rights perspective. At the
same time, international human rights agreements also suggest a need
for protecting intellectual property rights. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) 13 does not expressly refer to intellectual
property rights, but Article 27.2 states that "[e]veryone has the right
to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author."
Clause 1 to Article 27 also states, however, that everyone has "the
right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits."
Article 27, thus carries with it a tension familiar to intellectual property law - the tension between protection and participation. In other
words, "tension between rules that protect the creators of information, and those that ensure the use and diffuse of information.' 1 4 Similarly, Article 15 of The International Covenant on Economic Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 15 identifies a need to balance the protection of both public and private interests in intellectual property.
This article recognizes the right of everyone to take part in cultural
life, and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applica13G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
14 Drahos, supra note 2, at 358.
15G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) [hereinafter ICESCR].
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tions.16 It also recognizes, however, the right of everyone to benefit

from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from
any scientific, literary, or artistic production of which he or she is the
author. 17 The article binds States to design intellectual property systems that strike a balance between promoting general public interests
by granting access to new knowledge easily, while at the same time
protecting the interests of authors and inventors in such knowledge.
As far as TRIPS is concerned, the text is fairly explicit in regards
to patent protection in all fields of technology on issues such as: the
grant of rights, the duration of protection, and modes of enforcement.
Potential links between human rights and TRIPS are indicated by the
presence of provisions such as Articles 7, 8, 29 and 31. (A) Promoting
technological innovation, transfer and dissemination of technology in
a manner conducive to social and economic welfare; 18 (B) allowing
the member states (i) to adopt measures necessary to protect public
health and nutrition,' 9 (ii) to promote the public interest in sectors of
vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, 20 (iii) to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights, 21 (iv)
to restrict practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology2 2 and (v) to take action
against anti-competitive practices; 2 3 (C) providing an exception for (i)
the commercial exploitation to protect public order or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid
serious prejudice to the environment2 4 and (ii) diagnostic, therapeutic
and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animal 25 are
measures that - at least in theory - are conducive to the promotion and

protection of human rights and seek to maintain the balance sought
under Article 27 of UDHR and Article 15 of ICESCR.
Therefore, a prima facie case can be made that intellectual property rights and human rights accommodate each other in international
instruments, and there is very little conflict between the two. Nonetheless, there exist some fundamental differences which are summarized as follows: (a) the overall thrust of the TRIPS Agreement is the
promotion of innovation through the provision of commercial incenId. art. 15(1)(a)-(b).
Id. art. 15(1)(c).
18 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 7.

16
17

19 Id. art. 8(1).
20

Id.

21 Id.

art. 8(2).

Id.
23 Id. art. 31(k).
24 Id. art. 27(2).
25 Id. art. 27(3)(a).
22
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tives.2 6 The various links with the subject matter of human rights (the
promotion of public health, nutrition, environment, and development)
are generally expressed in terms of exceptions to the rule, rather than
as the guiding principles themselves, and are made subject to the provisions of the Agreement. (b) While the Agreement identifies the
need to balance rights with obligations, it gives no guidance on how to
achieve this balance. The Agreement only alludes to the responsibilities of patent holders that should balance those rights in accordance
with its own objectives.2 7 (c) Like any international treaty, TRIPS
removes a degree of autonomy from the States. Prior to TRIPS, states
could decide the level of protection they would allow to cover a technology they saw relevant to their development and public needs.2 8 (d)
The protection contained in the TRIPS Agreement focuses on the
forms of protection that have developed in industrialized countries. 2 9
For example, in the case of patents, protection in the Agreement is
most relevant to the protection of modern forms of technology (i.e.
biotechnology), and most relevant to innovators situated in a select
number of industrialized countries. This inference comes from World
Bank figures relating to patent applications that show an overwhelming presence of technology holders and applications in developed nations.30 Other factors for a human rights approach are efforts to
extend patent life beyond the 20-year TRIPS minimum, to limit compulsory licensing in ways not required by TRIPS, and to limit exceptions that facilitate prompt introduction of generics. These measures
1
have been referred to as - 'TRIPS plus'. 3
Thus, there are doubts if the TRIPS Agreement satisfies the concerns raised from a human rights perspective. As noted in the High
Commissioner's report, "a human rights approach requires that the
public/private balance under Article 15 of ICESCR should be struck
with the primary objective of promoting and protecting human rights.
The balance should not work to the detriment of any other rights in
the Covenant, and should also be consistent with the Vienna Declara26 Report of the High Comm'r of the Human Rights Comm'n, The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop. Rights on Human Rights, T 20-28,

U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (2001) available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huri

doca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2001.13.En? [hereinafter U.N. CHR Report].
27 Id.
23.
28 See generally Lewis, supra note 4.

29 U.N. CHR Report, supra note 26, 25.
30 Id. (citing World Bank, World Development Indicators2000, World Bank, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, Table 5.12).
31 Globalization, TRIPS and Access to Pharmaceuticals,WHO POLICY PERSPECTIVES
ON MEDICINES: WHO MEDICINES STRATEGY: 2000-2003, No. 3, March 2001, at 4.
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tion that declares, "human rights are the first responsibility of
Governments.

32

III.
POLICY OPTIONS UNDER

TRIPS

This part examines the rules of interpretation used when interpreting the TRIPS Agreement, and the three options under TRIPS:
compulsory licensing, parallel imports, and 'limited exceptions' to patent rights under Article 3. The conclusion is that the correct interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement must be one that is consistent with
States' obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights and also
the rights of a patent holder. First, however, it is important to indicate
that historically TRIPS and its provisions relating to patent rights
have been a highly politically sensitive issue,3 3 and remain still today.
Many commentators have examined recent controversies through a
35
political lens. 34 The "Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health"

adopted at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference held in 2001 at
Doha (Doha Declaration), and the recent decision by the Council for
TRIPS for "Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health" 36 are significant developments in this regard. The next part will discuss how genuinely these
two documents address the real issue.
32 U.N. CHR Report, supra note 26,

1

13.

33 See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS

11-25 (1998).
34 An indication of that are the reports regarding anthrax controversy in the US and
Canada in 2001, where both the countries threatened using the option of compulsory licenses to force Bayer to supply anthrax drug at a substantially reduced market price, see
Editorial, 358 The Lancet 9293, 10 November 2001; see also Leo Lewis, Anthrax drugs
sparks outcry, Independent on Sunday October 28, 2001, at 5; see also Sarah Bosley, Drug
Dealing, The Guardian, October 24, 2001.
35 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Nov. 20, 2001, WTO Res.,
4th Sess., Ministerial Conference, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
However, the content of the declaration was hotly debated with a typical north-south axis
is play. Prior to and after the Doha Declaration papers submitted in WTO meetings on
behalf of the US and the developing countries justify such a conclusion. Two contrasting
drafts before the Doha Meeting are availableat http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips
e/mindecdraft_w312_e.htm & http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/mindecdraft
w313_e.htm (last visited April 1, 2002). For the post Doha developments, see http://www.
wto.org/english/news e/news02_e/trips-reg-020307_e.htm (last visited April 1, 2002); see
also Ellen't Hoen, Public Health and InternationalLaw: TRIPS, PharmaceuticalPatents,
and Access to Essential Medicines: a Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27
(2002). Many activists have trumpeted Doha Declaration to be a victory for the developing
world.
36 Doc. No. WT/L/540, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tripse/implem
_para6_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS Council Decision].
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A.

Rules of Interpretation

Well established in international law is that the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties 37 is an authoritative statement, and a
definite guide on treaty interpretation. According to Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention, "[a] ...treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose. '38 The
Article further provides that in addition to the text, its article, and
preambles, the context for the purpose of interpretation of a treaty
shall comprise: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty made between
all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; and (b)
any instrument made by one or more parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty, and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 39 Together with the context, subsequent
treaties and practice relating to the treaty and "any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties" may
also be used.40 If the interpretation according to Article 31 leaves ambiguity, obscurity, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable, there are supplementary means of interpretation. These
include the preparatory work of the treaty, and the circumstances of
41
its conclusion.
The TRIPS Agreement is an annexure to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, and WTO law should guide its interpretation. Article 3.2 of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding
states that the existing rights and obligations of the member states
must be clarified in accordance with customary interpretation rules of
public international law. 42 WTO case law accepts that the Vienna
Convention is a codification of customary international law, therefore
binding all States,43 and that Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have attained the status of a rule of customary international
law. 44 Thus, TRIPS should be interpreted first according to its text,
37 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 22, 1969, 8
I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 17, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
38 Id. art. 31(1).
39 Id. art. 31(2).
40 Id.art. 31(3).
41 Id. art. 32.
42 GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 33 I.L.M. 112, 134 (1994).
43 United States - Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS2/AB/R (April 29, 1996) at 17.
44 Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS8/AB/
R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (October 4, 1996) at 10 - 12.
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including its preambles. It should then be interpreted according to

prior decisions interpreting the treaties, customary international law,
other relevant rules of international law, writings of the most "highly
qualified publicists" related to TRIPS, and the preparatory work and

circumstances of the Agreement of TRIPS, if a reasonable interpretation is not available through other means. 45 Additionally, paragraph

5(a) of the Doha Declaration states that "[in applying the customary
rules of interpretation of public international law, each provision of
the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and
principles." The second part of the fourth paragraph of Doha Declaration also states "... we reaffirm the right of WTO Members to use, to
the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexi-

bility for this purpose." However, the chapeau of the paragraph 5 of
the Declaration clarifies that the members have flexibility but must
"maintain [their] commitments in the TRIPS Agreement.

'46

There are numerous provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, in particular the Preamble and Articles 1, 7, 8, 27, 30 and 31 which indicate
that provisions of the TRIPS can be interpreted to allow member
countries flexibility in balancing their obligations to accord exclusive

patent rights in fulfilment of their obligations to protect the right to
health. For example Article 7 (Objectives) provides that intellectual
property rights should contribute "to the promotion of technological

innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the
45 David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92
AM. J. INT'L L. 398, 399-413 (1998).
46 The legal status of the declaration is disputed. It has been suggested that the Declaration constitutes a supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, see Carmen Otero Garcia-Castrillon , An approach to
the WTO Ministerial Declaration on the Trips Agreement and Public Health, 5 J. INTL.
ECON. L. 212 (2002); but see Steve Charnovitz, The Legal status of the Doha Declarations,5
J. INT'L ECON. L., 207 (2002) (according to another view, a Ministerial Conference pronouncement is not treaty language or a treaty interpretation, but, it might be a subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding 'the application' of a treaty's provisions which is
recognised by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31.3 (a), as a proper
consideration in treaty interpretation); but cf. James T. Gathii, The Legal Status of the
Doha Declarationon Trips and Public Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
the Treaties, 15 HARV. J. L.& TECH. 291 (2002) (yet, another view is that under customary
international law the declaration constitutes an interpretative part of the interpretation of
TRIPS). The declaration is significant because it constitutes an acknowledgement that provisions of TRIPS and by virtue of it, the present patent regime, has a major role to play in
the accessibility of medicines to vast chunk of humanity. Post-Doha, there is little or almost
no chance that for the time being complaints would be presented before the Dispute Settlement Body on these issues. The declaration can also play a big role in evolution of a
more stable and a fair legal regime if the WTO members show understanding to each
other's interests and need to address the health crisis and decide to follow the declaration
as an interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement.
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mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge,
and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare and to the
balance of rights and obligations." The Agreement resumes this theme
in Article 8 (Principles) allowing WTO member countries to adopt
measures necessary to protect public health and promote the public
interest in sectors vital to their development, as well as to prevent the
abuse of patent rights and practices that unreasonably restrain trade
and the international transfer of technology. The earlier two articles
amplify the recognition in the Preamble that 'developmental and technological objectives' should underlie 'public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual property'.
B.

Compulsory Licensing

The TRIPS Agreement does not mention the term 'compulsory
license' in the text, but Article 31 is understood to allow compulsory
licensing and government use. Compulsory licensing allows a third
party to exploit a patent, whereas government use allows the government (through an authorised party if appropriate) to exploit the invention. Article 31 does not limit the grounds on which compulsory
licensing is permissible, and there is a distinct balancing act to establish a government's right to issue compulsory licenses while attempt47
ing to safeguard the rights of the patent holder whenever possible.
The article does expressly refer to a number of circumstances, however, when compulsory licenses can be granted. These situations include: (a) situations of national emergency or extreme urgency, 48 (b)
cases of public non-commercial use, 49 (c) cases where there is a need
to 'correct anti-competitive practices,' 50 and (d) cases of dependent
patents, where the exercise of one patent is dependent on the infringement of another.5 1 In general, any potential user is required to have
unsuccessfully undertaken prior negotiations with the patent owner
but for the first two situations where there is no requirement to
negotiate.
Compulsory license has long been recognized as the most important tool for addressing the adverse effects of the patent grant on pub47 Robert Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPs: The PharmaceuticalIndustry Drive to
Harmonize Global Intellectual PropertyRules, and the Remaining WTO Alternatives A vailable to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT.'L ECON. L. 1069, 1113 (1996) [hereinafter

Weissman].
48 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 31(b).
49 Id.
50 Id. art.
51

31(k).
Id. art. 31(1).
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lic welfare. 52 A compulsory license can be used either by way of (a)
actually granting it and exploiting the license or (b) threatening its use
and forcing the patent holder to revise its own pricing and supply
strategy. Developing countries, in particular have a compelling need
to use compulsory licensing to improve access to medicines, vaccines,
and other public health related inventions.
According to one view, the conditions of Article 31 are not a sig-

nificant restriction to the introduction and efficient operation of compulsory licensing regime.5 3 No developing country to date, however,

has made use of compulsory licensing as a tool to address public
health issues. 54 There are a number of economic and political reasons
for this, 55 but there are also legal impediments as well. A number of
conditions need to be satisfied before a country can legally grant com-

pulsory license. There must be an effort to obtain authorization from
the right holder "within a reasonable period of time" on "reasonable
commercial terms. ' 56 The article further requires that the right holder
shall be paid "adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each
'5 7
case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization.

One of the most important restrictions is contained in Article 31(f) the use of commercial license should be "predominantly for the supply of the domestic market." The term "predominantly" in Article
52 Frederick M. Abbott, Compulsory Licensing for Public Health Needs: The TRIPS
Agenda at the WTO after the Doha Declaration on Public Health, Quaker United Nations
Office, Occasional Paper No. 9 (2002), available at http://www.geneva.quno.info/main/
search-publication.php?loop=0# (last visited December 26, 2003) [hereinafter Abbot]; see
Carlos Correa, Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in Developing
Countries 93-94 at http://www.southcentre.org/publications/publichealth/publichealth.org
(for compulsory licensing provisions in various national legislations) [hereinafter Correa].
53 Weissman, supra note 47, at 1113.

54 F.M. Abbott, The TRIPS Agreement, Access to Medicines and the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference 11 (2002), available at http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/OP7Abbotl.pdf.
55 The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
(IFPMA) has on its website the following reasons against the issuance of compulsory licenses: (a) They may reduce incentive to innovate. If a country adopts compulsory license
measures, then a natural consequence is for fewer research funds to be allocated either to
that country or disease area due to the resulting disincentives for research. (b) Generic
drugs manufactured under a compulsory license in developing countries will be parallel
exported to developed countries. (c) Governments tend to use compulsory licensing measures as industrial policy instead of using it as a pro-consumer tool. (d) There are safety
reasons: developing countries do not have the infrastructure or administrative systems in
place to ensure and monitor the correct supply and delivery of medication; see IFPMA,
TRIPs, PHARMACEUTICALS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH
CARE ACCESS, DRUG QUALITY AND DRUG DEVELOPMENT (2002), available at http://www.

ifpma.org/documents/NR86/TRIPS.pdf.
56 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 31(b).
57 Id. art. 31(h).
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31(f) implies that some exportation under compulsory license from
the exporting nation could be allowed.

From a policy perspective, this is a virtual impediment. Less-developed nations that lack infrastructure and technical capabilities to
build a reliable domestic industry able to supply modern pharmaceutical products are most likely to face serious problems due to this re-

quirement. Even Canada, with a high per capita income, excellent
universities, and a population during the 1970s of roughly 22 million,
found it necessary to import most of the bulk pharmaceuticals ulti-

mately supplied under compulsory licenses. 58 Thus, smaller less developed nations will have to issue their compulsory licenses mainly for

importation rather than domestic production. This in turn requires
that competitive global market supply sources exist. 59 On the other

hand, countries that have the capacity to export compulsory licensed
drugs are prevented from exploiting to the full scale of their economic

position. Furthermore, a successful compulsory license requires expeditious licensing procedures. Article 31 also requires judicial or other
60
independent review of the decisions taken by the licensing authority,
which might take too long if examined from a pharmaceutical company's perspective. 61 The Agreement does not provide any guideline

for the exact interpretation of significant terms such as "reasonable
period of time, '' 62 "reasonable commercial terms,"63 "national emergency,"'6 4 "predominantly for the supply of the domestic market" and
"adequate remuneration. ' 65 Thus, the text of Article 31 does not fully
develop the factors required for the issuing of compulsory licenses
under legitimate circumstances. 66 Since no dispute has been referred

to the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism on the issue of compul58 F.M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented
Medicines in Developing Countries 29 (Comm'n on Macroeconomics & Health, Working
Paper No. WG4:1, 2001) availableat http://www.cmhealth.org/docs/wg4paperl.pdf (last visited January 28, 2004)[hereinafter Scherer & Watal].
59 Abbott, supra note 52, at 29.
60 Scherer & Watal, supra note 58, at 28-29.
61 The longer the issuance of compulsory licenses is delayed after patented drugs enter
the marketplace, the less time licensees have to recover their startup costs and the more
difficult it is to achieve effective competition among multiple generic substitute suppliers.
62 Alan 0. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals,Developing Countries, and the Doha "Solution", 3 CHi. J. INT'L L. 47, 52 (2002) [hereinafter Sykes].
63 Id.
64 Id. at 56.

65 According to Weissman, this condition creates a critical obstacle to adopting a compulsory licensing program for a developing nation. Weissman, supra note 47, at 1114.
66 Sara M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions under the TRIPs Agreement: Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 941, 961 (2000)(citing Richard H. Marschall,
Patents, Antitrust and the WTO/GATT: Using TRIPs as a Vehicle for Antitrust Harmonization, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1165, 1188-89 (1997)).
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sory license, the precise scope of the provisions in the absence of any
ruling from a panel/Appellate Body remains unclear.
C. ParallelImports

Parallel importing allows importation of a product from a country
where a patent holder sells it at a lower price, essentially taking advantage of differential pricing. The underlying concept for allowing
parallel imports is that since the inventor has been rewarded through
the first sale or distribution of the product, they now have no right to
control the use or resale of goods put on the market with their consent. In other words, the inventor's rights have been "exhausted". Parallel imports allow consumers to shop on the world market for the
lowest price for a patented product. They are particularly important in
the health sector, where the pharmaceutical industry sets prices differently throughout the world for the same medicine. Importation of a
patented medicine from a country where it is sold at a lower price
enables more patients in the importing country to gain access to the
product, without preventing the patent owner from receiving the remuneration for the patented invention in the country where the product was first sold.
The availability of parallel importing depends on how the doctrine of exhaustion of rights is interpreted. The language of Article 6
of TRIPS excludes the patent rights exhaustion question from WTO's
dispute resolution jurisdiction, unless there is discrimination based on
the nationality of the rights holder. 67 It is interesting to note that an
instrument supposed to be comprehensive on intellectual property
matters overlooks this significant issue. General GATT principles
seem to support the permissibility of parallel imports 68 and WHO also
explicitly supported the use of parallel imports in order to advance the
principle of 'preferential pricing in poor countries.' 69 Although it appears that member countries have a very broad leeway to implement
parallel importation policies, the doctrine of international exhaustion
as applied to patents remains controversial from both legal and economic aspects. There is an economic risk that the doctrine of exhaustion may discourage price discrimination, favoring the developing
67 Article 6 of the TRIPS states that: "For the purposes of dispute settlement under this
Agreement, subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be
used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights." 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1200 (1994).
68 Correa, supra note 52, at 77.
69 Id. at 77 (WHO has stated that "in cases where drug prices are higher in poor countries than in richer ones, recourse to parallel imports in low-income countries in order to
reduce prices might be appropriate, while preventing parallel exports to industrialized
countries")
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countries. If parallel imports were to be admitted generally, then companies would tend to charge a single price worldwide, leading to an
increase in the supposedly lower price that may otherwise be charged
in low-income countries. Cross-market leaks concern the pharmaceutical industry because they could reduce its profit margins, and
thereby its ability to recoup R&D investments. There are further
questions concerning parallel importation from markets where
pharmaceuticals prices are regulated. As Correa points out, overuse of
the exhaustion doctrine could conflict with the exclusive right of importation conferred by article 28(a) of TRIPs, and with the thrust of
article 27(1) of TRIPs, which forbids discrimination "as to... whether
products are imported or locally produced. ' 70 A number of developing countries have been forced to remove parallel importing provisions from their patent legislation. For example, Thailand's patent law,
which previously allowed parallel importation of generic medicines in
some instances, now precludes it entirely. 71 Nevertheless, in the absence of any definite legal guidance, it is still an option for developing
countries to allow international exhaustion, parallel importing, and to
continue to be TRIPS compliant.
D. Article 30 Solution
Article 30 of TRIPS expressly authorizes Members to provide
"limited exceptions" to patent rights under certain conditions. 72 The
term "limited exceptions" in the Article allows for deviations from
general rules within established boundaries. The exceptions should
not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of patents and
should not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of patent
holders by taking into account the legitimate interests of third parties.
One example of allowable exceptions could be the so called 'Bolar'
exception. This exception allows generic manufacturers to start the
approvals process from public health authorities for marketing generic
versions of patented drugs before the patent expires to ensure that the
generic drug is ready to market as soon as the patent expires. The
Bolar exception is recognised in both developed and developing coun70 Id. at 76 ("Other authorities counter that article 28 is subject to article 6 and therefore cannot be subject to WTO dispute settlement procedures").

71 See generally Rosemary Sweeney, The U.S. Push for Worldwide Patent Protectionfor
Drugs Meets the AIDS Crisis in Thailand: A Devastating Collision, 9 PAc. RIM L. & POL'Y
J. 445 (2000).

72 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 30 ("Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third
parties").
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tries. 73 This exception provides some relief from the artificial extension of patent rights beyond the normal life of the patent; but in order
to gain full benefit from the exception, the capability to manufacture
sufficient quantities of the generic drug to satisfy market demand
must exist as soon as possible after the patent expires.
1.

Exceptions under Article 30.

If Article 30 is read with Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS, limited exceptions can be justified for public health crisis in developing countries. According to Abbott, criteria for authorizing exceptions under
Article 30 may include: (a) whether the importing country is confronting an un-addressed health need; (b) whether the importing
country has the financial resources to pay for patent drugs or other
public health related inventions, whether locally produced or imported, to supply the needs of 'all' those in the need of treatment; and
(c) whether the exporting country has the capacity to supply low-price
pharmaceuticals or other public health inventions.74 The decision to
use Article 30 would be with the country that exports the drugs. It
would have to consider whether allowing a generic competitor to
manufacture and import a patented drug would unreasonably harm
the interests of the patent holder. If the country considers such a move
to be detrimental to its interests, it may refuse to authorize this exception, but it might also treat the social welfare benefits of access to
medicines and balance appropriately the interests of the patent
holder. As far as the importing country is concerned, it might have to
issue compulsory licenses to overcome the objection from a local patent holder. But, in situations where the drug is not under patent or the
local patent holder consents to importation, there would be no requirement of issuing a compulsory license and use of Article 30 would
be enough.
Authorization of the export of public health related inventions
without the consent of the patent holder would not be dependent on
Article 31(f). There would be no need of a formal interpretation of
Article 31 to allow compulsory licenses for imports to be used in connection with exports undertaken under Article 30. This exception
would allow a country that has production facilities for drugs to manufacture and export without going through the laborious procedure of
issuing a compulsory license. An interpretation of Article 30 that al73 Consumer Project on Technology, Existing and Model Bolar Provisions (showing the
Bolar provisions of Argentina, Canada and the United States), available at http://www.cp
tech.org/ip/health/research/legislation.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2003).
74 Abbott, supra note 52, at 33.
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lows exports of health products without the consent of the patent
holder would have the following advantages over Article 31 approach:
(a) It would provide the simplest and most direct solution to the
problem for developing countries.
(b) It could be limited to health problems the Doha Declaration
seeks to address by restricting its application to exports of
health products.
(c) It could allow the decision for a compulsory license to remain
in the country of consumption. It is neither logical nor desirable for an importing country to have to rely on an exporting
country to issue a compulsory license on its behalf, which
would be the case under an Article 31 solution.
(d) It would allow compensation to be paid to the patent holder
in the country of consumption, if a patent exists. If a patent
does not exist in the importing country, then logically no
compensation should be paid. It does not make sense for
compensation to be paid in the exporting country where the
product is not consumed which would be the case under the
Article 31 solution and hence may also result in double
compensation.
2.

Canada Generics

Article 30 is more operationally feasible as exporting countries
would be more willing to use it by making a one-off amendment to
their patent laws to implement this exception and it also safeguards
the interests of all the stakeholders involved. 7 5 However, in the Canada Generics case, a WTO panel, on a complaint by the European
Union, held that a Canadian regulation that permitted manufacture
and storage of patented products before the expiration of the patent
was not compliant with the TRIPS Agreement, though generic manufactures could test patented products before the required period of
76
protection expired.
75 Amir Attaran. The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
Access to Pharmaceuticals,and Options under WTO Law, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.

MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 859, 870 (2002) [hereinafter Attaran] ("[f]rom the activist perspective,
it is certainly more straightforward to use. From the industry perspective it avoids broaching amendments to TRIPS, which could lead to the undoing of TRIPS in more dangerous
ways (e.g., tampering with Article 27.1 and WTO members' obligation to offer patent protection for pharmaceuticals). From all perspectives, it is likely to be more expeditious,
which means less time and energy spent on conflict, and more rapid progress toward solving what could be a future barrier to pharmaceutical access").
76 Report of the Panel. Canada-PatentProtection of PharmaceuticalProducts, WT/
DS114/R at 146, 7.7 (Nov. 17, 2000) (the disputed sections of the Canadian Patent Act,
which created exceptions to the exclusive rights of patent owners read as follows: Section
55.2(1): "It is not an infringement of a patent for any person to make, construct, use or sell
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It was stated that for a measure to satisfy the requirements of
Article 30, it should satisfy the following three requirements: (a) it
should be limited; (b) it should not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent; and (c) it should not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights holder, taking into account the legitimate interests of third parties. 77 These conditions need
to be interpreted in relation to each other and a separate meaning
should be given to each of the three to avoid redundancy. 78 By taking
a skewed approach the panel held that "limited exception" means a
"narrow exception - one which makes only a small diminution of the
rights in question. '79 "Normal exploitation" includes a "more or less
brief period of market exclusivity after the patent has expired" by precluding the generic competitors from building an inventory during the
patent period, 80 and when considering "legitimate interests", the legitimacy and weight of the patent owner's legitimate interests get priority over the third party interests. 81 Therefore, it could be argued that if
the panel did not allow stockpiling of a patented product, it seems
impossible to authorize the manufacture for export and sale of a product when a patent is in force. 82 Thus, either an exception needs to be
created for the current situation or the law needs to be repealed
thereby causing legal uncertainty 83 and it remains doubtful if the Bolar exception would provide any real benefit for the majority of the
developing countries.
One of the first things to note is that the case was dealing with
substantially different context and it is difficult to predict how the case
would be applied in the present circumstances. The panel's interpretation is not an authoritative interpretation on legitimacy of all types of
regulatory review exceptions or other relevant aspects of national patent systems. Furthermore, the interpretation adopted in Canada
the patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information required under any law of Canada, a province or a country other than
Canada that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of any product." (Regulatory Review Exception).
Section 55.2 (2): "It is not an infringement of a patent for any person who makes,
constructs, uses or sells a patented invention in accordance with subsection (1) to make,
construct, or use the invention, during the applicable period provided for by the regulations, for the manufacture and storage of articles intended for sale after the date on which
the term of the patent expires." (The Stockpiling Exception)).
77 Id. 1 7.20.
78 Id.
79 Id.

7.21.
7.30.

80 Id. 7.56.
81See id. 7.60.
82 Attaran, supra note 75, at 872.
83 Id.
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Generics was twisted and in violation of the rule of interpretation of
international treaties. In deciding on "limited exception" and "legitimate interests", the panel skipped to the negotiating history of the
TRIPS Agreement as a source of treaty interpretation. It did not apply the interpretative sources under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, according to which Article 30 of TRIPS should have been
interpreted in light of the context, purpose and object of the TRIPS
Agreement. 84 The narrow reading of the term "limited exception" was
also repugnant to the Appellate Body's decision in EC-Hormones
where it was held that ". . .merely characterizing a treaty provision as
an exception does not by itself justify a stricter or narrower interpretation of that provision than would be warranted by examination of the
ordinary meaning of the actual treaty words, viewed in context and in
the light of the treaty's object and purpose..." 8 5 or, in other words, by
applying the normal rules of treaty interpretation. According to
Howse, the correct approach would have been to interpret "limited"
by not only taking into account the restriction on the right holders'
interests but also public health and the interests of consumers generally.8 6 On the issue of normal exploitation of the patents, before construing the term "normal exploitation", it needs to be considered if a
measure which aims to prevent or stop the abuse of a patent because
of local non-working or insufficient working or higher prices of the
patent product or a measure for national emergency or to deal with
anti-competitive actions of the patent holder could affect the normal
exploitation of the patent by the patent holder. For example, an action
of a patent holder to intentionally increase the price of the product by
not supplying it in enough quantities to the market cannot be justified
as "normal exploitation" of the patent. Only where a government
measure does not aim to curtail practices analogous to those above
mentioned should the enquiry move to the interpretation of the
phrase "normal exploitation." In Canada Generics, while dealing with
that phrase, the panel was guided purely by economic considerations
and reflected a bias to protect the rights of the patent holder. 87 The
distinction drawn by the panel between the testing exception and
stockpiling provision was artificial and cannot be supported by the

84 Robert L. Howse, The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel: A Dangerous Precedent
in Dangerous Times, 3 J. WORLD. INTELL. PROP. 493, 496 (2000) [hereinafter Howse].
85 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (Report of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R) Jan. 16,
1998, at 104 (relied upon by Howse, supra note 82).
86 Howse, supra note 84, at 497-98.
87 Id. at 499.
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text of the article. 88 Similarly, merely because the Article mentions
the phrase "legitimate interests of the patent owner" before "legitimate interests of third parties", it does not automatically lead to a
conclusion that the patent owners' interests are more important. The
provision is primarily to balance the interests of the patent holder and
the third parties. 89 The interpretation adopted by the panel silenced
the "competing social and economic interests entirely by starting off
with defining the rights holder's interests as so weighty or fundamental that other legitimate interests cannot possibly outweigh the
prejudice to the right holder's interests." 90 Moreover, the composition
of the clause and the presence of a comma before the last clause of the
article lead to an inference that the legitimate interests of third parties
are to be taken into account with all other clauses of Article 30; such
as normal exploitation and the legitimate interests of the patent
holder.
Canada Generics also discussed whether the treatment of patent
holders in the field of pharmaceutical invention as less favourable
than other inventions violated the anti-discrimination provision in Article 27.1 of TRIPS. The panel found that the exceptions under Article
30 cannot include exceptions to the non-discrimination provisions in
Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. Thus, if a state measure is designed in such a way that it is applicable only in the field of pharmaceutical products without being applicable to other sectors, according
to Canada Generics, the measure would be illegal. 9 1 However, there
are adequate grounds to state that this construction is not justified.
The non-discriminatory provision in Article 27.1 is different from
those found in other WTO Agreements. 92 Article 30 is a broad exception and it can be assumed that exception is explicitly applicable to the
subject matter, i.e. patent rights. It is not conditional on some other
provision of the TRIPS unlike other provisions which have been qualified by using the phrase "subject to" to that other provision. 93 Moreover, even if it is assumed that Article 30 is subject to Article 27.1, it
can still be directed only to the pharmaceuticals as all Article 27.1
provides is that patent rights shall be enjoyable "without discrimination", which implies that unfair or unjustifiably adverse treatment is
not allowed. 94 If special regulation of the pharmaceutical industry is
88 Id.at 500.
89 Id. at 501.
9 Id.
91Attaran, supra note 75, at 871.
92 Howse, supra note 84, at 505.
93 Id. at 506 (listing arts. 6, 27.1, 36 and 65.1 as examples).
94 Abbot, supra note 52, at 38.
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specifically required to address important public interests, it cannot be
termed as discriminatory. On the other hand, it is recognition of legitimate public interests. "To read Article 30 consistently with world
health policy would mean giving clear priority to the legitimate health
interests in question over many competing interests of the rights
holder; if the reference to public health in Article 8.1 of TRIPS is to
have any significance at all, it must surely be that the specific provisions of the TRIPS Agreement should be read in a manner consistent
with what is required for the protection of public health, as defined by
''95
world health policy.
IV.
DOHA DECLARATION AND THE DECISION OF
THE TRIPS COUNCIL

In the above discussion I have indicated that the best possible
solution to deal with the current global health crisis would be an article 30 approach. It is an easier, quicker and the least complicated way
to take measures to address health crisis in any region of the world.
Unfortunately, the discussions in the WTO have failed to move in a
direction that prefers an Article 30 approach. In this section I discuss
the dialogue within the WTO system to reform the intellectual property regime to provide for affordable medicines, with specific reference to the Doha Declaration and the latest decision of the TRIPS
Council.
A.

The Doha Declaration

Doha Declaration was significant because for the first time within
the WTO it was openly acknowledged that the public health problems
in many countries were in part a result of the intellectual property
regime under the TRIPS Agreement. The declaration came in the
backdrop of an increased mutual sensitivity between the developed
and the developing countries in the wake of the terrorist attacks and
the anthrax controversy in the U.S. The Declaration was intended to
dispel the notion that the organization is not sympathetic to human
rights issue and solely concentrates on a trade motivated agenda.
The Declaration proposes a balancing approach to interpretation
of TRIPS Agreement. 96 The first four paragraphs of the Declaration
95 Howse, supra note 84, at 505.
96 Doha Declaration, supra note 35, 4 ("We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does
not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the
Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of
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are more in the form of a preamble to a statute and lack any substantive rule. In these initial paragraphs, the Ministerial Conference
agreed that the TRIPS Agreement had to be a part of wider national
and international action to address the grave public health problems
afflicting many developing and least developed countries, especially
the problems resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and
other epidemics. 97 In paragraphs 3 and 4, the WTO members tried a
balancing act. On the one hand the Declaration states that the intellectual property protection is important for the development of new
medicines and reiterates the commitment to TRIPS. On the other
hand it also acknowledges the effect of IP protection on drug prices
and agrees that TRIPS should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health. Thus, it affirms the "right of WTO
members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement,
which provides flexibility for [protecting public health]."
The seven paragraph long Declaration leaves open all the possibilities that already existed under the TRIPS Agreement, without
providing clear guidance as to which one of the options would be the
best to achieve the desired results alluded to in the opening
paragraphs. The all important paragraph 5 recognizes the flexibilities
available to a member country. Paragraph 5(a) is very broad and
could be interpreted along with paragraph 4 to allow resort to the
Article 30 exception. 98 It also appears from the Declaration that countries are free to decide what provisions they will have in national laws
relating to parallel importing. 99 Member nations are only required to
apply most-favored nation and national treatment systematically.
However, the emphasis seems to be on the use of the compulsory
licensing option. As far as the compulsory license is concerned, the
Declaration states: "each member has the right to grant compulsory
licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such
licences are granted."' 10 0 The issue, however, is not whether compulWTO Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all").
97 Id. I 1 & 2.
98 Paragraph 5(a) reads as follows: "In applying the customary rules of interpretation of
public international law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light
of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives
and principles."
99 Doha Declaration, supra note 35, 5(d) ("The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS
Agreement that are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave
each Member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFN and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4").
100 Id. 5(b) (the paragraph provides as follows: "Each member has the right to grant
compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses
are granted").
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sory licensing is permitted under TRIPS but under what circumstances
can it be done. The Declaration, except for allowing the use of compulsory license, does not throw any light on how to interpret terms
like "reasonable commercial terms," "predominantly for the supply of
the domestic market" and "adequate remuneration." Thus, many of
the questions remain unanswered. For example, it is unclear if a patent holder would have to acquiesce to the compensation decided by
the government or it merely creates a presumption that the compensation given would be considered adequate and fair? Would the adequate compensation involve R&D costs for the drug in question and
also the unsuccessful research aimed at the same medical problem?1 01
Furthermore, if a member country could be allowed to grant compulsory licenses in favour of non-domestic manufacturers is not
102
obvious.
The only concession the Member states were given was a right to
determine what constitutes a "national emergency." Without defining
any parameters to be considered nor giving a hint as to the factors to
be taken into account before declaring a national emergency, it was
provided that "public health crisis, including those relating to HIV/
AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. 10o3
Doha Declaration in paragraph 6 recognized the difficulties that
countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector may encounter in making effective use of compulsory licenses under TRIPS. Thus, it left to the TRIPS Council to find
"expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General
Council before the end of 2002". In subsequent meetings of the
TRIPS Council, however, it was quite clear that the U.S., advocating
the cause of its pharmaceutical industry, was in no mood for concessions. By December 2002, the talks reached a stalemate primarily over
the scope of diseases to be covered. The group of African, Caribbean
and Pacific countries wanted the solution under Paragraph 6 to have
reference to the first paragraph of the Doha Declaration, i.e., a specific reference to the public health problems afflicting many developing and least developing countries, especially resulting from HIV/
AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. However, the U.S. wanted any solution to be limited to the diseases mentioned above or other infectious
epidemics of comparable gravity and scale. This was opposed by the
101 Sykes, supra note 62, at 151.
102 Divya Murthy, The Future of Compulsory Licensing: Deciphering the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1299, 1332-1336
(2002) (arguing that term 'third party' should not be limited to domestic manufacturers).
103 Doha Declaration, supra note 35, 5(c).
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majority of the WTO members as an attempt to limit the scope of
diseases already agreed to at Doha. Even as late as June 2003, no consensus seemed to be emerging. As the developing countries backed by
many international organizations were in no mood to back down, and
a fear of possible backlash at Cancun loomed large, the U.S. did bow
to the pressure. Just few days before the 2003 Cancun Ministerial
Conference, the Council for TRIPS arrived at a decision on the "Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and public health." 10 4
B. Decision of the TRIPS Council
The decision aims to provide waivers from the obligations set out
in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Article 31 if certain exceptional circumstances exist. The decision lays down several conditions to be met
both by the importing and the exporting country for a compulsory
license to be granted under the Decision, and the general responsibility of all WTO members.
An importing member country has to fulfill the following conditions: (A) to qualify as an eligible importing member, the country
should either be a least developed country or any other member that
notifies the Council for TRIPS of its intention to use the waiver only
in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. 10 5 Some member
countries have already declared that they will not use the system or
have limited the situations where they can use the system. 1°6 (B) The
notification from the importing country should: 10 7 (i) specify the
names and expected quantities of the product; (ii) confirm that the
member has established that it has insufficient or no manufacturing
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector for that product; 0 8 and, (iii)
also confirm that in case the imported product is already under a patent, a compulsory license has already been granted. (C) The importing
country has to take reasonable measures to prevent re-exportation of
104 TRIPS Council Decision, supra note 36.
105 TRIPS Council Decision, supra note 36, l(b) (note 2 of the Decision also clarifies
that the notification does not have to be approved by a WTO body in order to use this
system set out in the Decision).
106 TRIPS Council Decision, supra note 36, note 3 (the list of countries are: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States of America).
107 TRIPS Council Decision, supra note 36, 2(a).
108 This condition is not required for a least developing country. The Annex to the Decision provides two ways by which Assessment of Manufacturing Capacities in the Pharmaceutical Sector is to be done.
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the products that have actually been imported into their territory.
They have to ensure that the imported products are used for public
health purposes only. 10 9 (D) The importing country is not obliged to
pay "adequate remuneration" as set out in Article 31 (h) of TRIPS if
the exporting country has already done so with respect to the product
imported.
Among the conditions to be fulfilled by an exporting country, the
following are required: (A) the compulsory license granted by exporting member has to meet the following requirements:' 1 0 (i) no more
than the amount required by the importing country may be manufactured and the entire production has to be sent to the importing country; (ii) the product to be exported under compulsory license should
be clearly identified through specific labeling or marking. Such identification could be through special packaging or special coloring or
shaping of the products, provided it does not impact the price significantly; (iii) the information related to the compulsory license and the
product shall be publicly available on a website and the Council for
TRIPS shall be notified about the compulsory license and conditions
attached to it. (B) The exporting country should pay adequate remuneration to the patent holder taking into account the economic value
to the importing country."'
Apart from the obligations cast on the importing and the exporting country, the Decision also mentions the general responsibility of
all member countries: (A) All members have to ensure effective legal
means to prevent importation and sale of the products using the
waiver."l 2 (B) A general obligation is cast upon all the members to
promote transfer of technology and capacity building in pharmaceutical sector to overcome the problem identified in paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration. 1 3
Reading the Decision along with the Doha Declaration it is quite
clear that of the three options discussed earlier in this paper, the WTO
considers compulsory license as the most feasible option to address
the health crisis. However, as already identified, any approach that
seeks to use compulsory license as an option for the present crisis has
numerous legal, economic, and political shortcomings. Though the decision throws some light on legally troublesome terms like "adequate
remuneration" and "predominantly for the supply of the domestic
market", there is no doubting the fact that the process of obtaining
109 TRIPS Council Decision, supra note 36,
110 Id. 2(b).
111 Id. 3.
112 Id.

5.

113 Id.

7.

4.
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compulsory license as such is legally cumbersome. Clearly, the developed countries and its pharmaceutical manufacturers are apprehensive over the possibility where the generic manufacturers exploit the
waiver to divert drugs into the E.U. or the U.S., thereby making a
dent in the profits of the companies. Under the new mechanism, two
compulsory licenses would have to be issued in most of the circumstances, and the Decision gives the W.T.O. a new authority to second
guess the granting of individual compulsory licenses to generic companies. The decision fails to clarify if "economic efficiency" can be a
ground for determining the lack of manufacturing capacity in the importing country. It is still to be seen how this system would work and if
it would provide a sound legal framework under which life saving
drugs at affordable prices could be provided to the poor. One thing,
that clearly emerges is that the decision adds many constraints on the
business practice of the generic companies.
Thus, the earlier criticism of the IPR regime under the WTO that it prohibits the countries from taking effective steps to address
the public health crisis - still remains valid. The Doha Declaration and
the TRIPS Council Decision purport to address the problem, but they
fail to do so effectively and can, at the most, be seen as a public relations exercise by the WTO. However, the current decision is a temporary waiver and a permanent amendment to the TRIPS is scheduled
for 2004. It is thus imperative that the developing countries put up a
united front, in the same manner as was done at Cancun, and push for
an amendment that simplifies and clarifies the procedures under the
TRIPS and removes unnecessary obstacles to address the public
health problems.
V.
CONCLUSION

Patents on pharmaceuticals may be required for providing incentives to the industry and to encourage research and development in
new drugs and vaccines, but the effectiveness of the current system
needs a thorough evaluation. Patent protection has to be attuned to a
level that provides incentives but at the same time does not harm public interests. Interpretation and implementation of TRIPS would have
life or death consequences for the citizens of the less developed world
and the consequences would be felt globally. A balanced approach
may go a long way in ameliorating the suffering of those fighting for
their life against diseases. It is important to interpret TRIPS keeping
in mind its social ramifications, taking into consideration the interests
of those who at first sight do not seem to be a part of the global trad-
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ing system. It is, thus, necessary to make optimum use of the "windows" provided in the Agreement - "windows" that allow the
governments to look beyond the interests of the patent holder while
framing their policies and interpreting this highly technical instrument. Furthermore, the need is to identify the interest that is being
harmed but hardly highlighted: 'right to health'. This human right may
be ill defined and may have been traditionally considered weak, 114 yet
only by using the language of human rights would it be possible to
argue for carving out exceptions to the patent rights. 115 Right to
health is an appropriate value that can balance the patent rights under
TRIPS. An argument based on this right would not only call for availability of medicines at lower price but it would also stress upon the
states to provide funds for research and development on drugs for
diseases that affect a major chunk of population. Right to health can
work as a double edged sword. Private pharmaceutical sector also
stands to gain from the above mentioned proposition through increased funding from the government.
However, within this debate lie larger issues. The current intellectual property regime needs to live up to its objective of promoting
social good. It needs to dispel the notion that social welfare is being
overlooked in favour of private interests. Intellectual property needs
to provide a conceptual apparatus which mediates the tension prevailing in the society.1 1 6 It must have a convincing explanation that granting of property rights motivates the innovators and benefits the
society. 117 It must explain why the "one shoe fits all" approach is followed and why the trade off between innovation and motivation
should be the same for all kinds of industries and all types of technol114
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ogy. It must also move away from being 'inventor centric' so as not to
ignore the other interests. Moreover, as exemplified by Canada
Generics it is easy to get influenced by the technocratic notions of the
system while neglecting other dimensions to the problem. According
to Drahos this is the reason why the institution of intellectual property
has evolved and globalized without some set of shared understandings
concerning the role it has to play in social issues including health of
citizens around the world. 118 "Linking intellectual property to human
rights discourse is a crucial step in the project of articulating theories
and policies that will provide guidance in the adjustment of existing
intellectual property rights and the creation of new ones. Human
rights in its present state of development offers at least a common
vocabulary with which to begin this project, even if, for the time being,
not a common language."'1 9 Human rights organizations and practitioners need to take a cue from the point made by Drahos. "A human
rights approach offers an alternative vision of the purpose and requirements of intellectual property as well as a set of obligations that
places intellectual property in a wider context.' 20 Such an approach
would demand that the intellectual property system exhibits greater
coherence and persuasiveness to gain and keep public respect for its
survival. The present controversy raises genuine doubts on the way
the intellectual property law has been enforced. International community has to respond to contemporary demands of society through interactions among all the stakeholders and there is a need to depart
from the traditional thinking - both as regards to patent rights and the
right to health.

118 Drahos, supra note 2, at 368.
119 Id. at 368-69.

120 Audrey Chapman, The Human Rights Implications of Intellectual Property Protection, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L., 861, 879 (2002).

